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FOURTH AMENDMENT SYMPOSIUM
THE UNINVITED EAR: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BAN ON ELECTRONIC
GENERAL SEARCHES
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this article is that the fourth amendment
ban on general searches, correctly understood, is applicable to
extended electronic surveillance of citizens by government of-
ficials and that such surveillance should, therefore, be re-
stricted to rare situations involving highly unusual public
need. For purposes of analysis, electronic surveillance (bugs,
wiretaps, etc.) may be divided into two categories. First, there
are so-called "rifle-shot" electronic interceptions, which in-
volve surveillance of a specific conversation. Second, there are
"extended" electronic interceptions, which involve continuing
surveillance of conversations over a period of time. Only rifle-
shot surveillance is consistent with the United States Consti-
tution. Extended electronic surveillance is a general search
condemned by the fourth amendment.
The author realizes that the thesis of this article is decid-
edly "against the wind" of recent developments. Many recent
electronic surveillance decisions simply assume the constitu-
tionality of extended surveillance without directly addressing
the issue. But the underlying constitutional issue has not been
settled, and the article is written with the hope that the ap-
proach of 1984 will cause the nation to re-evaluate recent
trends and return to sound fourth amendment principles. If
not the 1984 Court, perhaps some future Supreme Court will
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once again enforce the ban on electronic general searches.
The article has three major sections. The first section re-
views the historical development of fourth amendment law:
first, to show that a core purpose of the fourth amendment
was to ban general searches and second, to establish the func-
tional characteristics of general searches. Next, the article
shows that extended electronic surveillances are paradigmatic
general searches. Finally, the article focuses on the dangers of
electronic surveillance, and concludes that enforcement of the
fourth amendment ban on extended electronic surveillance is
sound social policy.
II. HISTORICAL DISCUSSION OF GENERAL SEARCHES
A. The Fourth Amendment Ban on General Searches
One core purpose of the fourth amendment is to prohibit
general searches. The United States Supreme Court has so
held, consistently and unmistakably, in a long series of cases.
For example, in Boyd v. United States,1 the earliest of
the Supreme Court's landmark decisions on the fourth
amendment, the Court reviewed the historical events that led
to the adoption of the fourth amendment and concluded that
a core purpose of the framers and ratifiers was to ban general
searches pursuant to writs of assistance (warrants to search
for smuggled goods) and general warrants (warrants to search
for seditious writings).
These things [events concerning writs of assistance in the
colonies and general warrants in England] ... were fresh
in the memories of those who achieved our independence
and established our form of government.... [The legal
rules banning such general searches] were in the minds of
those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Consti-
tution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of
what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.'
Thirty years later, in Weeks v. United States,3 the Court
returned to the theme of general searches.
[The fourth amendment] took its origin in the determina-
1. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2. Id. at 625-27.
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This was the landmark fourth amendment decision im-
posing the exclusionary rule on federal courts.
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tion of the framers of the Amendments to the Federal
Constitution to provide for that instrument a Bill of
Rights, securing to the American people, among other
things, those safeguards which had grown up in England
to protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, such as were permitted under the general war-
rants issued under the authority of the Government ....
Resistance to these practices had established the princi-
ple which was enacted into the fundamental law in the
Fourth Amendment, that a man's house was his castle
and not to be invaded by any general authority to search
and seize his goods and papers.'
The Court confirmed the ban on general searches in many
subsequent cases. In Marron v. United States,5 for example,
the Court stated, "General searches have long been deemed to
violate fundamental rights. It is plain that the [fourth]
Amendment forbids them."' In Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States,7 the Court stated, "[The second clause of the
fourth amendment] emphasizes the purpose to protect against
all general searches. Since before the creation of our govern-
ment, such searches have been deemed obnoxious to funda-
mental principles of liberty. . . . The need of protection
against them is attested alike by history and present condi-
tions." In Harris v. United States,9 Justice Murphy stated
that a "general exploratory search" is "a type of search which
is most roundly condemned by the Constitution.' 0 "[Tihe
Fourth Amendment," Murphy continued, "was designed in
part, indeed perhaps primarily, to outlaw such general war-
rants . . ."
The Warren Court repeatedly invoked the fourth amend-
ment ban on general searches. Here are some characteristic
passages:
[W]e think it is clear that this warrant was of a kind
which it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
4. Id. at 390.
5. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
6. Id. at 195.
7. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
8. Id. at 357.
9. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
10. Id. at 189 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 191.
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forbid-a general warrant. . . ." [T]he Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments guarantee to John Stanford that no
official of the State shall ransack his home and seize his
books and papers under the unbridled authority of a gen-
eral warrant.1 8
We have examined on many occasions the history and
purposes of the Amendment. It was a reaction to the evils
of the use of the general warrant in England and the writs
of assistance in the Colonies, and was intended to protect
against invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life, .... from searches under indiscriminate,
general authority.14
[O]pposition to general searches is a fundamental of our
heritage and of the history of Anglo-Saxon legal princi-
ples. Such searches, pursuant to "writs of assistance,"
were one of the matters over which the American Revolu-
tion was fought. The very purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment was to outlaw such searches. 8
The [fourth] Amendment was in large part a reaction to
the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so
alienated the colonists and had helped speed the move-
ment for independence."
In recent years, the Burger Court has invoked the fourth
amendment prohibition against general searches many times.
In Andresen v. Maryland,17 for example, Justice Blackmun,
for the majority, said, "General warrants, of course, are pro-
hibited."'18 Justice Brennan, in dissent, made the same point:
"General warrants are especially prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment."' In Stone v. Powell,20 Justice White's majority
opinion stated,
The [fourth] Amendment was primarily a reaction to the
evils associated with the use of the general warrant in
England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies ...
12. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480 (1965).
13. Id. at 486.
14. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (footnote omitted).
15. Id. at 312 (Fortas, J., concurring).
16. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969). A dissenting Justice stated,
"This view . . . would not authorize the general search against which the Fourth
Amendment was meant to guard." Id. at 780-81 (White, J., dissenting).
17. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
18. Id. at 480.
19. Id. at 492 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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and was intended to protect the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life ... from searches under un-
checked general authority."1
Recently, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,22 Chief Justice
Burger said, "This search warrant and what followed the en-
try on petitioner's premises are reminiscent of the general
warrant or writ of assistance of the 18th century against which
the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect. 23
The list of authorities is by no means exhaustive. 4 Taken
together, the cases clearly establish that one core purpose of
the fourth amendment was to ban general searches. What are
general searches? What are the functional characteristics of
the searches that fall under this constitutional prohibition?
B. Two Types of General Searches
General searches banned by the fourth amendment fall
into two major classes.2 5 First, there are searches which are
general with regard to the places and persons to be searched.
Searches for smuggled goods pursuant to writs of assistance
are typical of this class. These searches will be referred to as
"dragnet" searches. Second, there are searches which are gen-
eral with regard to things to be searched for and/or seized and
21. Id. at 482 (footnote omitted).
22. 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
23. Id. at 325.
24. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 327 (1978); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977) (fourth amendment's commands stemmed from
the colonists' experience with writs of assistance); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 327-29 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
466-67 (1971); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50, 58, 64 (1967); Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 727-29 (1961); Goodman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139
(1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928).
See also J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-48 (1966); N.
LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONsTITUTION 73-79 (1937).
25. For example, in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965), the Supreme Court
acknowledged the two classes of general searches. After discussing writs of assistance
and early general warrants which authorized dragnet searches of unspecified persons,
the Court described a second class of general searches which are specific as to the
individual but general as to items to be searched for and seized.
In later years warrants were sometimes more specific in content.., and
[authorized] seizure of all the papers of a named person thought to be
connected with a libel....
It was in the context of the latter kinds of general warrants that the
battle for individual liberty and privacy was finally won.
Id. at 482-83 (footnote omitted).
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thus involve indiscriminate prying into a person's private ef-
fects. Searches for seditious writings pursuant to general war-
rants are typical of this class. These searches will be referred
to as "general rummaging." A brief examination of each of
these classes is appropriate.
1. Dragnet searches
One of the primary purposes of the framers and ratifiers
of the fourth amendment was to ban dragnet searches, i.e.,
searches undertaken pursuant to warrants which do not spe-
cifically identify the persons and/or places to be searched. Op-
position to general searches of this type developed primarily
in response to the hated colonial writs of assistance. These
writs authorized customs officials to enter and search all
premises at any time until six months after the death of the
present king in order to locate goods smuggled into the colo-
nies without payment of import duties. e Opposition to drag-
net searches also derived, in part, from dislike of English gen-
eral warrants authorizing searches of the dwellings of
unspecified persons suspected of publishing seditious
writings.27
The characteristic that makes dragnet searches "general"
is the claim of authority to search unspecified persons and/or
places. The warrant does not particularly describe, and thus
limit, the persons and places to be searched. Instead, it allows
the executing officers to search randomly among the general
population. The courts have long recognized that dragnet
searches are prohibited by the fourth amendment.' 8 The gov-
ernment's constitutional authority to search is normally re-
stricted to situations where probable cause exists to believe
that the search of specific individuals or locations will pro-
duce evidence of criminal activity. The search must be lim-
ited, not general, with regard to persons and places to be
26. See, e.g., N. LASSON supra note 24, at 51-78.
27. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763) (landmark English
case condemning dragnet searches for seditious libel).
28. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 327(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). "[T]he recurring desire of reigning officials to employ
dragnet techniques to intimidate their critics lies at the core of [the fourth amend-
ment's] prohibition. For it was such excesses that led to the ratification of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. See also Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965). "[T]he Fourth
Amendment was most immediately the product of contemporary revulsion against a
regime of writs of assistance . . . ." Id. N. LASSON, supra note 24, at 51-78.
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searched.
2. General rummaging
The fourth amendment was also intended to ban a second
class of general searches, namely general rummaging. Opposi-
tion to general searches of this type developed primarily in
response to the efforts of the English government during the
1760's to locate and seize seditious writings. The opposition
came to a focus in the celebrated English case, Entick v. Car-
rington,2 9 which held that general paper searches were con-
trary to the common law. The framers of the Constitution in-
corporated the doctrines of this case into the fourth
amendment, and the Supreme Court has invoked them in
many subsequent cases.3 0
On numerous occasions, the Court has explicitly stated
that the constitutional "evil" of this second category of gen-
eral searches is the rummaging. In Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire,"1 for example, Justice Stewart said, "[T]he specific evil
is the 'general warrant' abhorred by the colonists, and the
problem is not that of the intrusion per se, but of a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings. '3 2 In Andre-
sen v. Maryland,3 precisely the same point was made by both
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the majority, and Justice
Brennan, dissenting. Blackmun stated, "General warrants, of
course, are prohibited. . . . 'IT]he problem is . . . a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.' ,,34 Brennan
agreed that, "General warrants are especially prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment. The problem to be avoided is'. . . a
general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.'""
The characteristic that makes general rummaging a "gen-
29. 19 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
30. E.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
32. Id. at 467.
33. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
34. Id. at 480.
35. Id. at 492. Judge Learned Hand expressed a similar point of view in the
following oft-cited quotation from United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.
1930): "It is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment
is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists in rummaging
about among his effects to secure evidence against him."
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eral" search is the unrestricted examination of the contents of
an individual's papers and/or effects." Some of the seditious
libel warrants, for example, required the seizure of all the
books and papers of named individuals. Such warrants were
general in that they did not specifically limit the seizure to
items connected with criminal conduct. Obviously, in order to
execute such a warrant, the officer must undertake an un-
restricted search of the individual's most private domain-his
desks, cabinets, closets, files, chests of drawers, etc.-in order
to locate and seize all documents.
However, general rummaging is a functional necessity,
even when the warrant authorizes only the seizure of docu-
ments specifically found to be seditious or otherwise criminal.
In such cases, the effort to locate the documents is no less
pervasive, and the officer must examine all documents in or-
der to determine whether they contain criminal writings. The
vice is the unrestricted examination of the individual's most
private possessions. This is the characteristic that makes the
search for seditious writings "general," "unreasonable," and
hence unconstitutional.
The thesis of this article is that extended electronic sur-
veillance has characteristics comparable to both dragnet
searches and general rummaging and thus amounts to an un-
constitutional general search on both counts.
III. EXTENDED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AS A GENERAL
SEARCH
This section will demonstrate that extended electronic
surveillance inherently involves general searches banned by
the fourth amendment.8 7 Such surveillance normally involves
dragnet searches of communications by suspects and nonsus-
pects alike. Moreover, it characteristically includes general
auditory rummaging through private oral communications.
36. The Supreme Court has held that exploratory rummaging through personal
papers or effects constitutes an unconstitutional general search. In this article, we
focus on rummaging in an individual's papers for two reasons. First, the ban on gen-
eral rummaging originated with the Entick paper search, and there can be no doubt
that general paper searches remain within the core area covered by the ban. Second,
the general paper search is a form of rummaging that is directly analogous to the
rummaging of oral communications involved in extended electronic surveillance.
37. The Supreme Court has specifically held that electronic surveillance is, in
some circumstances, an unconstitutional general search. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967). See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
1000 [Vol. 22
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Indeed, extended electronic surveillance is an aggravated gen-
eral search which is far more intrusive than traditional general
searches. It is therefore contrary to the fourth amendment
ban on general searches and should be allowed, if at all, in
only the most critical and compelling cases.
One must recognize, at the outset, that electronic inter-
ceptions of oral communications are "searches" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. The leading case on point
is Katz v. United States.3 8 Police, acting without a warrant,
placed a bug on the top of a telephone booth. Katz went into
the booth and placed calls. The bug was activated and Katz's
oral statements were transmitted to auditors. The Court held
that the interception was a search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Absent exigent circum-
stances, the fourth amendment requires a search warrant.
Therefore, the bugging of Katz's conversations was
unconstitutional.
Since electronic interception of oral communications is a
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment, it obviously is subject to fourth amendment rules con-
cerning general searches. If extended electronic surveillance is
a general search or seizure, it should be banned as unconstitu-
tional, except in the most extraordinary circumstances.
A. Electronic Dragnets
In nearly all cases, extended electronic surveillance un-
avoidably involves dragnet interceptions of oral communica-
tions, sweeping up the private utterances of the innocent as
well as the guilty. 9 This is so obvious that it is difficult to
discuss without lapsing into truisms. Obviously a wiretap
transmits the communications of everyone using the
line-trade secrets of business acquaintances, confidential
communications to and from psychiatrists, financial and per-
sonal secrets of friends, communications subject to the attor-
ney-client privilege-everything. Obviously a bug transmits
oral communications of everyone within its range, in particu-
38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also United States v. United States Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
39. The only exceptions are rare situations where (1) the criminal suspect is the
only person who ever comes within hearing distance of a bug or (2) all persons over-
heard are involved in the criminal activity.
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lar, the intimate, private utterances that are not spoken even
over the telephone-personal confessions, the privacies of love
and sex, words spoken in anger and pain, words spoken when
one is asleep, words spoken to oneself when one is
alone-everything, even when spoken in a whisper.4
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the inherent dragnet
qualities of extended electronic surveillance is to describe a
fact situation involved in a recent case. 1 Pursuant to a federal
warrant, wiretaps were installed on two telephones in order to
listen to narcotics-related conversations of "Bynum and
others yet unknown." The agents recorded all conversations
during a thirty-four day period, including seventy-one calls
made by Bynum's child's babysitter, Donna, who was to-
tally innocent of any knowledge of ... [the] criminal en-
terprise .... The other party in each of these conversa-
tions ... was not a member of the narcotics conspiracy,
and the conversations, which were sometimes the subject
of jokes by the monitoring agents, were often of a highly
personal and intimate nature. 4"
Similarly, the agents listened to forty-seven innocent conver-
sations between one of the conspirators and "personal friends
who were not members of the conspiracy" and "a substantial
number of calls involving attorneys."' Justice Brennan noted,
"[T]he record fairly bristles with apparent instances of indis-
criminate and unwarranted invasions of privacy of nontargets
of the surveillance.""
The "dragnet" quality of wiretapping was pointed out as
early as 1928 in Brandeis' classic Olmstead dissent, where he
stated:
40. It is no answer that the government auditor may, in his or her discretion,
choose not to listen. Because no one can prove whether the oral communication was
overheard or not, the matter is left solely to the discretion of the auditor. Such dis-
cretion in the hands of petty government officials has long been recognized as one
strong indicator that an illegal general search is present. James Otis, in his renowned
1761 oration in Boston, said, "It is a power that places the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer." 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 141-42 (Wroth & Zobel
ed. 1965). This statement has been cited with approval on innumerable occasions, and
it has become axiomatic that the protection of fourth amendment rights may not be
left to the discretion of executing officials.
41. Bynum v. United States, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
952 (1975) (Brennan, J., Douglas, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. 423 U.S. at 954-55 (Brennan J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 955.
44. Id. at 953.
1002 [Vol. 22
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Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the
persons at both ends of the line is invaded . . . More-
over, the tapping of one man's telephone line involves the
tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he
may call or who may call him. As a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny in-
struments of tyranny and oppression when compared
with wire-tapping.45
Much later, in Berger v. New York, 4 the leading case
concerning the constitutional limits on electronic surveillance,
Justice Clark pointed out that extended electronic surveil-
lance inherently involves dragnet searches. Clark stated that
"[diuring such a long [two months] and continuous (twenty-
four hours a day) period the conversations of any and all per-
sons coming into the area covered by the device will be seized
indiscriminately and without regard to their connection with
the crime under investigation. '47 Justice Douglas, in his sepa-
rate concurrence, underlined Justice Clark's point: "The
traditional wiretap or electronic eavesdropping device consti-
tutes a dragnet, sweeping in all conversations within its
scope- without regard to the participants or the nature of
the conversations. It intrudes upon the privacy of those not
even suspected of crime and intercepts the most intimate of
conversations."4
Justice Douglas described the dragnet characteristics of
extended electronic surveillance in several other opinions filed
during the final decade of his long career. Dissenting in Os-
born v. United States,49 he wrote:
The invasion of privacy . . . extends .. .to anyone who
happens to talk on the telephone with the suspect or who
happens to come within the range of the electronic device.
Their words are also intercepted; their privacy is also
shattered. Such devices lay down a dragnet which indis-
criminately sweeps in all conversations within its scope,
without regard to the nature of the conversations, or the
participants. A warrant authorizing such devices is no
different from the general warrants the Fourth Amend-
45. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
46. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
47. Id. at 59.
48. Id. at 65 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
49. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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ment was intended to prohibit.50
Again, dissenting in United States v. Kahn," Douglas wrote:
To construe the warrant as allowing a search of the con-
versations of anyone putting in calls on the Kahn tele-
phone amounts, as the Court of Appeals said, "to a vir-
tual general warrant ..
Under today's decision a wiretap apparently need
specify but one name and a national dragnet becomes op-
erative. Members of the family of the suspect, visitors in
his home, doctors, ministers, merchants, teachers, attor-
neys, and everyone having any possible connection with
the Kahn household are caught up in this web.2
In short, extended electronic surveillance is indubitably a
dragnet search. It should be restricted on this ground alone. It
is a general search and, as such, should be banned by the
fourth amendment except in the most unusual situations. But
this is not all. Extended electronic surveillance is also a quin-
tessential general search of the general rummaging variety, an
ongoing monitoring of the spoken words and thoughts of its
targets.
B. General Rummaging of Oral Communications
Extended electronic surveillance is a general search be-
cause it involves general rummaging of oral communications.
Earlier portions of this article have demonstrated that one
traditional category of general searches involves paper-
searches and that the constitutional "evil" in such searches is
the rummaging, the unrestricted examination of one's private
written expressions." Extended electronic surveillance is di-
rectly analogous to general paper searches. It involves un-
restricted examination of an even more private and intimate
category of expressions than personal writings, namely spon-
taneous oral utterances.""
50. Id. at 353 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
51. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
52. Id. at 160-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
53. See supra note 29-36 and accompanying text.
54. Indeed, extended electronic surveillance would appear to involve a general
seizure, since, in most cases, all or nearly all communications are recorded. Since
some Supreme Court Justices have argued that the recording of a conversation is not
a seizure, primary reliance will not be placed on this theory.
1004 [Vol. 22
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The fact that extended electronic surveillance unavoid-
ably involves general rummaging through oral communica-
tions hardly requires extensive proof. Even if government offi-
cials have probable cause to suspect that oral communications
about crime will occur, monitoring and recording of all or
nearly all conversations is necessary, in most cases, in order
to locate and preserve the ones which contain admissible evi-
dence. This is particularly true because, unlike physical evi-
dence, oral communications do not exist at the time the war-
rant is issued. The government must wait and listen until
they occur. Moreover, unless communications are monitored
and recorded when they occur, they are forever lost. To be
effective, the uninvited ear must be always alert, and some
government official must listen to the content of each conver-
sation. This is general rummaging in its most intrusive form, a
random monitoring of one's most intimate expressions.
This is a key point in the analysis and it merits further
consideration. The characteristic shared by general rummag-
ing of papers and general rummaging of oral communications
by electronic surveillance is that government officials examine
the content of one's private expressions. In the general paper
search, the official must read an individual's private books
and papers in an effort to locate writings containing evidence
that someone has committed a crime." The content of the in-
dividual's private written expressions is examined. In ex-
tended electronic surveillance, the official must listen to an
individual's conversations in an effort to locate statements
containing evidence that someone has committed a crime. The
content of the individual's private oral expressions is ex-
amined. In both cases, the government intrudes into and ex-
poses the substance of one's most private thoughts and
expressions.
The fact that the fourth amendment bans government
surveillance of the contents of one's private expressions has
been discussed on many occasions. Consider, for example, the
following succinct explanation by Chief Judge Friendly of the
Second Circuit: "[Tihe vice lies in the unlimited search. The
55. The recognition that paper searches, in most cases, require government offi-
cials to read the suspect's writings goes all the way back to Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807, 808 (K.B. 1765), where defendants admitted that they "did necessarily
read over, pry into, and examine the said private papers, books, &c. of the plaintiff
19821 1005
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reason why we shrink from allowing a personal diary to be the
object of a search is that the entire diary must be read to
discover whether there are incriminating entries . ... "6
Precisely the same characteristic is present in bugging and
wiretapping. One must listen to the entire content of the oral
communications in order to discover anything incriminating.
Justice Stewart has also provided a clear explanation of
this point in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily." The warrant in the
Zurcher case authorized the search of a newspaper office and
the seizure of photographs of demonstrators who had attacked
police officers. In response to Justice White's contention that
a general search ("rummage at large") could be avoided by a
specific description of the property to be seized, Justice Stew-
art pointed out that "rummaging" is necessary to locate the
specific items to be seized. The police, pursuant to the
Zurcher warrant, were forced to view all the documents to lo-
cate those described in the warrant.58 Such rummaging is sim-
ilarly unavoidable in extended electronic surveillance.
The rummaging through innocent private conversations
which unavoidably accompanies extended electronic surveil-
lance was graphically illustrated in a recent Supreme Court
case, Scott v. United States.59 Eighteen U.S.C. § 2518(5) re-
quires that electronic surveillance "be conducted in such a
way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception . . . ." The question in
56. United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 897 (2d Cir. 1969) (emphasis ad-
ded); cf. ISRAEL & LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 96 (1974) ("[Ilt may sometimes be
unreasonable to permit search for and seizure of certain items, e.g., a diary, in that
even if they are specifically described the result will be a rummaging through and
official scrutiny of private writing unconnected with crime.").
57. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
58.
A search warrant allows police officers to ransack the files of a newspa-
per, reading each and every document until they have found the one
named in the warrant. . . .The Court says that "if the requirements of
specificity and reasonableness are properly applied, policed and ob-
served" there will be no opportunity for the police to "rummage at large
in newspaper files." But in order to find a particular document, no mat-
ter how specifically it is identified in the warrant, the police will have
to search every place where it might be-including, presumably, every
file in the office-and to examine each document they find to see if it is
the correct one. I thus fail to see how the Fourth Amendment would
provide an effective limit to these searches.
Id. at 573 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
59. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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Scott was whether the actual interceptions of nonpertinent
calls were "reasonable" in view of this statutory duty to mini-
mize. In many situations, the Court concluded, such intercep-
tions are reasonable.
Many of the nonpertinent calls may have been very short.
Others may have been one-time only calls. Still others
may have been ambiguous in nature or apparently in-
volved guarded or coded language. In all these circum-
stances agents can hardly be expected to know that calls
are not pertinent prior to their termination.6
The Court continued, "During the early stages of surveillance
the agents may be forced to intercept all calls to establish
categories of nonpertinent calls which will not be intercepted
thereafter." '6 Moreover, where clear categories of nonper-
tinent calls do not appear, "it may not be unreasonable to in-
tercept almost every short conversation because the determi-
nation of relevancy cannot be made before the call is
completed. '62 On the basis of this analysis, the Court con-
cluded that it was reasonable for the agents to intercept "all
the phone conversations over a particular phone for a period
of one month."'
The indiscriminate rummaging in Scott involved total
electronic surveillance of all oral communications, guilty and
innocent alike, and the Court's analysis shows why such ex-
ploratory rummaging is a functional necessity inherent in
electronic surveillance. Extended electronic surveillance is a
classic general search of the second ("general rummaging")
type and thus is subject to the fourth amendment ban on gen-
eral searches.
In short, extended electronic surveillance is an unconsti-
tutional general search on two counts. It is a dragnet search,
catching the oral communications of all persons within reach.
It is general rummaging, exposing one's most private speech
to government review. But the case does not stop there. Ex-
tended electronic surveillance is an aggravated general search
60. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
62. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Bynum v. United States, 423 U.S. 952, 954 (1975)
("[Algents must inevitably listen briefly to all calls in order to determine the parties
to and the nature of the conversation.").
63. 436 U.S. at 130-31 (emphasis added). Note that sixty percent of the calls
were found to be nonpertinent.
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having intrusive features far exceeding those associated with
traditional general searches.
C. Aggravating Features of Electronic General Searches
First, electronic surveillance invades an even more inti-
mate sphere of privacy than general paper searches, namely
the spontaneous oral utterances which occur in the course of
one's personal and family life. It does not take much imagina-
tion to picture the indignity that may result when the most
secret communications of one's private life, communications
so secret that they are not even reduced to writing, are broad-
cast at the police station.
Consider, for example, the facts of Irvine v. California."'
Police, seeking evidence of gambling activities, broke into the
Irvines' home on three occasions and planted a bug in the
hall, the bedroom where the Irvines slept, and the bedroom
closet. They then listened to the Irvines' conversations for
more than a month. The Court was appalled.
Science has perfected amplifying and recording devices to
become frightening instruments of surveillance and inva-
sion of privacy, whether by the policeman, the black-
mailer, or the busybody. That officers of the law would
break and enter a home, secrete such a device, even in a
bedroom, and listen for over a month would be almost in-
credible if it were not admitted. Few police measures have
come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately,
and persistently violated the fundamental principle de-
clared by the Fourth Amendment .... 65
In separate opinions, Justice Clark called the police conduct
"incredible" 66 and Justice Frankfurter called it "repulsive. 6 7
Second, government electronic surveillance has a strong
chilling effect on freedom of expression. In fact, the rule
against general searches developed largely in response to po-
lice activities which threatened this freedom. Entick v. Car-
64. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
65. Id. at 132.
66. Id. at 139.
67. Id. at 145 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Los Angeles police acted with-
out a warrant. Imposition of a warrant requirement would have made no substantial
difference, however, because as a subsequent Justice Department investigation dis-
closed, the police were acting with the approval of the District Attorney and a magis-
trate. Thus, if a warrant had. been required, one could easily have been obtained.
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rington,5 for example, involved efforts by officers of the Brit-
ish king to suppress criticism by political opponents.
Similarly, Stanford v. Texas,6' involved efforts by Texas po-
lice to suppress pro-communist literature. The Court repeat-
edly has recognized its constitutional duty to prevent the gov-
ernment from using general searches to suppress free speech.
Justice Brennan has vividly pointed out the chilling effect
of electronic surveillance on freedom of expression.
[W]e must bear in mind that historically the search and
seizure power was used to suppress freedom of speech
.... "Under Hitler, when it became known that the se-
cret police planted dictaphones in houses, members of
families often gathered in bathrooms to conduct whis-
pered discussions of intimate affairs, hoping thus to es-
cape the reach of the sending apparatus.". . . Electronic
surveillance strikes deeper than at the ancient feeling
that a man's home is his castle; it strikes at freedom of
communication, a postulate of our kind of society....
[Fireedom of speech is undermined where people fear to
speak unconstrainedly in what they suppose to be the
privacy of home and office .... If electronic surveillance
by government becomes sufficiently widespread, and
there is little in prospect for checking it, the hazard that
as a people we may become hagridden and furtive is not
fantasy.70
Third, electronic surveillance-especially bugging-has a
new feature that makes it much more intrusive than writs of
assistance and seditious libel warrants, namely duration. Even
the old general warrants contemplated an intrusion limited to
the time needed to conduct a physical search. The govern-
ment intruded for a brief period, then left. The citizen's pri-
vacy was once again intact. But, a bug never sleeps. The unin-
vited ear stays on and listens to everything that is said for as
long as it remains active. This is much more intrusive than a
normal physical search."1
68. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
69. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
70. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 469-71 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).
71.
We have here, however, a more powerful and offensive control over the
Irvines' life than a single, limited physical trespass. Certainly the con-
duct of the police here went far beyond a bare search and seizure. The
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The problem is compounded by another aggravating char-
acteristic of electronic searches, namely their secrecy. Tradi-
tional searches and seizures put the citizen on notice that his
privacy is being invaded. The individual is aware that the po-
lice are present, and he can guard against the exposure of his
secret thoughts. Electronic surveillance, on the contrary, must
be secret to be effective. The individual has no way of know-
ing that an uninvited ear is listening. Electronic surveillance
leaves the individual with the delusion that his privacy is in-
tact and gives him no opportunity to screen out nonpertinent
private communications that the police have no business hear-
ing. In total innocence, the individual is allowed to pour out
his most secret, intimate thoughts.
The combination of duration and secrecy leaves the indi-
vidual without a shred of privacy. Twenty-four hours a day
for weeks or months, all spontaneous oral utterances made in
the privacy of one's home and office are exposed. An invisible
government spy is, in effect, assigned to live in one's home
and listen to everything. The most intimate secrets are ex-
posed to public view.
Electronic surveillance has traits in common with another
practice condemned by the ratifiers of the Bill of Rights,
namely quartering of soldiers in colonists' houses. 2 The live-
in soldier or government official destroys the privacy of the
home. One may no longer speak freely. Understandably,
therefore, the third amendment banned such quartering. The
bug, however, is far more insidious than a person quartered in
the home. One does not even know it is there. There is no way
of guarding one's utterances against an unknown, invisible
spy. Here is how Justice Douglas described this phenomenon:
If a statute were to authorize placing a policeman in every
home or office where it was shown that there was proba-
ble cause to believe that evidence of crime would be ob-
tained, there is little doubt that it would be struck down
as a bald invasion of privacy, far worse than the general
warrants prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. I can see
police devised means to hear every word that was said in the Irvine
household for more than a month. Those affirming the conviction find
that this conduct, in its entirety, is "almost incredible if it were not
admitted."
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 145-46 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
72. U.S. CONST. amend.. IlI.
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no difference between such a statute and one authorizing
electronic surveillance, which, in effect, places an invisible
policeman in the home. If anything, the latter is more of-
fensive because the homeowner is completely unaware of
the invasion of privacy."
For all these reasons, extended electronic surveillance
should be unconstitutional in all but the most exceptional cir-
cumstances. It is a general search three times over. It is a
dragnet. It involves general rummaging of private thoughts. It
is far more intrusive and repressive than earlier kinds of gen-
eral searches. It is, in short, abhorrent to a nation that wishes
to preserve the privacy, liberty, and dignity of its citizens.
D. The Constitutionality of Rifle-Shot Electronic
Surveillance
Rifle-shot surveillance, in contrast, does not involve a
general search and is therefore constitutionally permissible
when conducted pursuant to a warrant. Rifle-shot surveillance
intercepts a specific conversation; it is not a dragnet rummag-
ing of all oral communications over a period of time. Where
the police have probable cause to believe that a specific future
oral communication will involve criminal activity-e.g., a
bribe offer, transmission of wagers, communication of classi-
fied information to a foreign government, planning of a bank
robbery, ordering of narcotics-it 'makes sense to allow the
limited interception of that particular communication. In such
a case, there is no dragnet interception of conversations of in-
nocent persons and no general exploratory rummaging among
private utterances. Nor are the aggravating characteristics of
extended surveillance present. The chilling effect on private,
nonpertinent conversations is minimized. No one is subjected
to the presence of an invisible government spy in the home or
office for extended periods.
In such a situation, a warrant for electronic interception
can provide protections comparable to those demanded of
traditional warrants for searches and seizures of physical ob-
jects. The thing to be seized is particularly described. No dis-
cretion is left to the executing officer. The invasion of privacy
is brief. The government gets in and out quickly, leaving the
73. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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individual's privacy intact. Searches of this nature are consis-
tent with the fourth amendment.
E. The Constitutional Limits on Electronic Surveillance:
Lopez, Osborn, Berger, and Katz
Past United States Supreme Court cases confirm the
analysis presented above. Traditionally, electronic intercep-
tion of oral communications was not subject to the fourth
amendment.74 In the 1960's, the Court reversed itself and held
that electronic surveillance is a "search and seizure" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment.78 Thus, the Court had
to decide which electronic surveillance the fourth amendment
allows, and which it prohibits. The guidelines were worked out
in a series of cases decided in the mid-sixties.
The stage for the discussion was set in Lopez v. United
States, e where Justice Brennan's dissent articulated the fears
of law enforcement officials over the application of the fourth
amendment to wiretaps. Police officials believed wiretaps
would not be permissible if subjected to fourth amendment
analysis since they would not be construed as reasonable
searches. Brennan reiterated this view by stating, "For one
thing, electronic surveillance is almost inherently indiscrimi-
nate, so that compliance with the requirement of particularity
in the Fourth Amendment would be difficult. 7 7 Brennan,
however, was not convinced that all electronic surveillance
was unconstitutional. He suggested, without deciding, that in
some limited cases electronic surveillance might be consistent
with the fourth amendment. He continued:
If in fact no warrant could be devised for electronic
searches, that would be a compelling reason for forbid-
ding them altogether. The requirements of the Fourth
Amendment ... are the bedrock rules without which
there would be no effective protection of the right to per-
74. The leading case, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928),
held that wiretapping does not involve a search or seizure because (1) there is no
trespass into a constitutionally protected area and (2) there is no examination or
seizure of a physical object.
75. The reversal occurred in a series of well-known cases including Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); and
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
76. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
77. Id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sonal liberty.. . . Electronic searches cannot be tolerated
in the name of law enforcement if they are inherently
unconstitutional.
7 8
Brennan concluded his discussion by warning, once more:
"This is not to say that a warrant that will pass muster can
actually be devised."'
Next, in Osborn v. United States,'0 the Court explicitly
considered the constitutionality of electronic surveillance pur-
suant to a warrant for the first time. Based on information
that Jimmy Hoffa's attorney was trying to bribe a prospective
juror, federal law enforcement officers obtained a warrant au-
thorizing a secret agent to record a particular conversation
with the attorney. When the equipment malfunctioned, a sec-
ond warrant was obtained to record another particular conver-
sation. The tape was admitted at trial, and the attorney was
convicted of attempting to bribe a juror. In affirming the con-
viction, the Court stressed the narrowly limited nature of the
judicial authorization. "The issue here," the Court empha-
sized, "is . . . the permissibility of using such a device under
the most precise and discriminate circumstances . . .
Such rifle-shot electronic surveillance, the Court held, is per-
missible. There is no suggestion in the opinion, that extended
surveillance can be squared with the fourth amendment. In-
deed, the Court's emphasis on the restrictions involved in the
Osborn wiretap strongly implied that extended surveillance
would not be allowed.
The next year, in Berger v. New York," the Court again
indicated that the restriction of the Osborn warrant to rifle-
shot surveillance was critical to the warrant's constitutional-
ity. The Court stressed that Osborn allowed surveillance only
under "the most precise and discriminate circumstances."
83
Moreover, the Court indicated that it was precisely those re-
strictions which made the warrant acceptable under the
fourth amendment. "Through these 'precise and discrimi-
nate' procedures the order authorizing the use of the elec-
tronic device afforded similar protections to those that are
78. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 465.
80. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
81. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
82. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
83. Id. at 56 (quoting Osborn, 385 U.S. at 329).
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present in the use of conventional warrants authorizing the
seizure of tangible evidence.""" The implication is clear: with-
out these restrictions, the authorization would not provide
protection comparable to conventional warrants and would
therefore violate the fourth amendment.
The Court's intent to limit Osborn to rifle-shot surveil-
lance was evidenced in the following important language:
"[T]he order authorized one limited intrusion rather than a
series or a continuous surveillance. . . . Moreover, the order
was executed. . . with dispatch, not over a prolonged and ex-
tended period. '85 Thus, when the Supreme Court first consid-
ered the constitutional limits of electronic surveillance pursu-
ant to warrant, it concluded that only rifle-shot surveillance
was consistent with the fourth amendment.
Berger v. New York, the leading case in which the Su-
preme Court explained the fourth amendment restrictions on
electronic surveillance, merits further attention. The issue was
the constitutionality of a New York statute authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance pursuant to judicial warrants. The Court
held the statute unconstitutional and, in the course of its
opinion, strongly suggested that extended electronic surveil-
lance is per se unconstitutional:
New York's broadside authorization rather than being
"carefully circumscribed" so as to prevent unauthorized
invasions of privacy actually permits general searches by
electronic devices, the truly offensive character of which
was first condemned in Entick v. Carrington .... We
believe the statute here is equally offensive ....[A]uthorization of eavesdropping for a two-month period
is the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and
seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable
cause .... During such a long and continuous (24 hours
a day) period the conversations of any and all persons
coming into the area covered by the device will be seized
indiscriminately and without regard to their connection
with the crime under investigation."
In short, although the Court mentioned other problems with
the New York statute as well, it apparently felt that extended
electronic surveillance is itself a general search and seizure
84. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added).
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prohibited by the fourth amendment.
The Court was fully aware that it was placing substantial
constitutional limits on electronic surveillance. The majority
acknowledged and accepted this reality: "It is said that
neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eavesdropping can
be drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's require-
ments. If that be true then the 'fruits' of eavesdropping de-
vices are barred under the Amendment. 87 -However, rifle-shot
surveillance is permitted. The Court continued:
[T]his Court has in the past, under specific conditions
and circumstances, sustained the use of eavesdropping
devices .... In [Osborn v. United States] . . . the eaves-
dropping device was permitted where the "commission of
a specific offense" was charged, its use was "under the
most precise and discriminate circumstances", and the ef-
fective administration of justice in a federal court was at
stake.88
But the New York statute was different. It authorized general
searches and therefore violated the fourth amendment: "Our
concern with the statute here is whether its language permits
a trespassory invasion of the home or office, by general war-
rant, contrary to the command of the Fourth Amendment. As
it is written, we believe that it does.'"
The intent of the Berger majority to impose far-reaching
constitutional restrictions on electronic surveillance was
pointed out by Justice Black's dissenting opinion:
[Ilt seems obvious to me that . . . [the majority's] hold-
ing, by creating obstacles that cannot be overcome, makes
it completely impossible for the State or the Federal Gov-
ernment ever to have a valid eavesdropping statute....
[ . .ITIhe Court's purpose is clear: it is determined to
ban all eavesdropping .... [Tihe Court means to inform
the Nation there shall be no eavesdropping-period. ...
• . .[What the Court does today is ... the erecting
out of it [the fourth amendment] a constitutional obstacle
87. Id. at 63.
88. Id. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion stressed that the Osborn case al-
lowed only selective wiretaps that do not involve "rummaging around, collecting ev-
erything in the particular time and space zone." Id. at 64.
89. Id. at 64.
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against electronic eavesdropping that makes it impossible
for lawmakers to overcome.90
Justice White, also dissenting, wrote:
The Court appears intent upon creating . . . new consti-
tutionally mandated warrant procedures carefully tailored
to make eavesdrop warrants unobtainable.
... Today's majority does not, in so many words,
hold that all wiretapping and eavesdropping are constitu-
tionally impermissible. But by transparent indirection it
achieves practically the same result by striking down the
New York statute and imposing a series of requirements
for legalized electronic surveillance that will be almost
impossible to satisfy. '
The principle that warrants for electronic surveillance
must be limited to rifle-shot interceptions was strongly rein-
forced in the landmark case, Katz v. United States," also de-
cided in 1967. As was previously discussed," FBI agents, act-
ing without a warrant, installed a bug on top of a public
telephone booth. Katz's calls were recorded and resulting evi-
dence was used to convict him of sending wagers by tele-
phone. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held the in-
terception was an unconstitutional search and seizure because
there was no warrant.
Discussing the warrant requirement, the Court stated:
[T]he surveillance was limited, both in scope and in du-
ration, to the specific purpose of establishing the contents
of the petitioner's unlawful telephonic communications.
The agents confined their surveillance to the brief peri-
ods during which he [Katz] used the telephone booth,
and they took great care to overhear only the conversa-
tions of the petitioner himself.
Accepting this account of the Government's actions
as accurate, it is clear that this surveillance was so nar-
rowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate,
properly notified of the need for such investigation, spe-
90. Id. at 71, 86, 88 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black was overstating the
matter since the majority explicitly reaffirmed the constitutionality of rifle-shot
surveillance.
91. Id. at 111, 113 (White, J., dissenting).
92. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
93. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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cifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed,
and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would en-
tail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appro-
priate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure
that the Government asserts in fact took place.9
This certainly implies that less "narrowly circumscribed"
surveillance would violate the fourth amendment. The Court
continued in the same vein:
Only last Term we sustained the validity of such an au-
thorization, holding that, under sufficiently "precise and
discriminate circumstances," a federal court may em-
power government agents to employ a concealed elec-
tronic device "for the narrow and particularized purpose
of ascertaining the truth of the ... allegations" of a "de-
tailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a spe-
cific criminal offense." Osborn v. United States ....
[T]he Court, in Berger v. New York, . . . said that "the
order authorizing the use of the electonic device" in Os-
born "afforded similar protections to those . . . of con-
ventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evi-
dence.". . . Here, too, a similar judicial order could have
accommodated "the legitimate needs of law enforcement"
by authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic
surveillance.95
This insistent repetition of the theme was no accident. The
purpose was to reemphasize the strictures on extended elec-
tronic surveillance laid down in Berger.
The message of Lopez, Osborn, Berger, and Katz is un-
mistakable. Electronic surveillance by government agents is a
search and seizure. It is subject to the fourth amendment. It is
permissible only when conducted pursuant to a warrant pro-
viding "similar protections to those of. . . conventional war-
rants." Rifle-shot surveillance of specific conversations is con-
stitutionally permissible. On the other hand, extended
electronic surveillance is a general search, and therefore,
banned by the fourth amendment."
94. 389 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 354-56 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
96. It bears repeating that constitutional bans are rarely absolute. Thus, ex-
tended electronic surveillance may be reasonable in highly unusual circumstances in-
volving compelling public need. Like prior restraints on expression, however, such
general searches should be allowed only in rare and extraordinary circumstances.
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Of course, subsequent Supreme Court cases provide little
support for the constitutional principles established in Lopez,
Osborn, Berger, and Katz. In the year following Berger and
Katz, the same year as Richard M. Nixon's successful "law
and order" presidential campaign, Congress enacted the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act
provides statutory authorization for extended electronic sur-
veillance. Within the next four years, Nixon appointed four
"law and order conservatives" to the Court. Relevant Su-
preme Court decisions since 1968 have merely interpreted the
Crime Control Act. These decisions, by and large, have evis-
cerated even the limited protections provided by the Act,
opened the door to indiscriminate electronic surveillance and
suggested that the Court is not at all inclined to enforce the
fourth amendment ban on general electronic searches . 7 Still,
it must be recognized that the constitutionality of the Act has
not been decided, and remains an open question.9
A core purpose of the fourth amendment is to prohibit
general searches. Dragnet searches and general rummaging
through a person's papers are general searches and thus pro-
hibited. Similarly, extended electronic surveillance should be
prohibited because it involves a dragnet search and general
rummaging through spontaneous oral statements. Indeed, se-
cret, extended electronic surveillance is an aggravated general
search. Therefore, it normally is banned by the fourth amend-
ment. In fact, the United States Supreme Court held such
surveillance banned by the fourth amendment when it first
confronted the issue in the 1960's.
97. E.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United
States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974);
United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971); Bynum v. United States, 513 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S.
952 (1975). Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in all eight cases. But see
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41
(1972); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), in which restrictions on electronic surveillance
were upheld.
98. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 133 n.6 (1978); United
States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 150 (1974).
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IV. WHY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BAN ON EXTENDED
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SHOULD BE ENFORCED
Numerous Supreme Court Justices have warned about
the dangers of electronic surveillance. At times the warnings
have come from liberal dissenters such as Brandeis, Warren,
Brennan, and Douglas. At other times, the warnings have
come from the majority or from conservative spokesmen such
as Clark, Harlan, and Powell. In the next few pages, a few of
the more notable passages will be reviewed. They add up to
an urgent notice of potential danger to privacy, liberty, and
political democracy."
Justice Brennan, the senior member of the present Court,
has argued the case against extended electronic surveillance
on many occasions. In a major 1963 opinion, for example, he
said:
[T]he risk [involved in electronic surveillance] . . . is of a
different order. It is the risk that third parties ... who
cannot be shut out of a conversation as conventional
eavesdroppers can be, merely by a lowering of voices, or
withdrawing to a private place-may give independent
evidence of any conversation. There is only one way to
guard against such a risk, and that is to keep one's
mouth shut on all occasions.
I. believe that there is a grave danger of chilling
all private, free, and unconstrained communication....
In a free society, people ought not to have to watch their
every word so carefully.
... [A]s soon as electronic surveillance comes into
play, the risk changes crucially. There is no security
from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating
the risk, and so not even a residuum of true privacy....
99. Even before extended electronic surveillance had emerged, the idea that the
fourth amendment throws a shield about the citizen's private expressions had been
invoked by Supreme Court Justices. Stephen J. Field, for example, a tower of the
Court's conservative wing from the 1860's to the 1890's, wrote:
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security,
and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but
exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection
and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all other
rights would lose half their value.
In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250 (1887).
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Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eaves-
dropping. They make it more penetrating, more indis-
criminate, more truly obnoxious to a free society.100
In Berger v. New York 10 ' the Court, speaking through a
more conservative spokesman, again stressed the dangers of
electronic surveillance. In his majority opinion, Justice Clark
said: "The need for particularity . . .is especially great in the
case of eavesdropping. By its very nature eavesdropping in-
volves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope ....
Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that
posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.' 0 2 These are
strong words, and note that Clark was a former United States
Attorney General who had ordered increased electronic sur-
veillance by federal investigators in 1947 when he was in
charge of the Justice Department. 0 3 Clark's concern about
electronic surveillance was based on first-hand knowledge and
is entitled to great weight.'0 4
A warning of the dangers of electronic surveillance is even
more persuasive when it comes from the Court's conservative
wing. Thus, the following statement by Justice Harlan, the
conservative conscience of the Warren Court, is particularly
worth noting:
The impact of the practice of third-party bugging, must, I
think, be considered such as to undermine that confi-
dence and sense of security .in dealing with one another
that is characteristic of individual relationships between
100. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450-52, 465-66 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Warren said, "I
also share the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan that the fantastic advances in the field
of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual
. " Id. at 441. Warren was well aware of the danger from first-hand experience.
When he took over as Governor of California in 1947, he found that his predecessor
had bugged the Governor's offices in Sacramento in a manner comparable to Richard
M. Nixon's White House bugging system. "I had always had an abhorrence of such
systems of surveillance," Warren wrote in describing the incident. E. WARREN, THE
MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 169 (1977).
101. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
102. Id. at 56, 63 (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 310 n.10
(1972).
104. Justice Clark's warning was reinforced by Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion. Electronic surveillance, Douglas stated, "is the greatest of all invasions of
privacy. It places a government agent in the bedroom, in the business conference, in
the social hour, in the lawyer's office-everywhere and anywhere a 'bug' can be
placed." 388 U.S. at 64-65 (emphasis added).
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citizens of a free society ...
Authority is hardly required to support the proposi-
tion that words would be measured a great deal more
carefully and communication inhibited if one suspected
his conversations were being transmitted and transcribed.
Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might
well smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous, im-
petuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse-that liber-
ates daily life.'05
The warning against electronic surveillance has also been
raised by Nixon appointees. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing statement by Justice Powell:
But a recognition of these elementary truths does not
make the employment by Government of electronic sur-
veillance a welcome development-even when employed
with restraint and under judicial supervision. There is,
understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehen-
sion that this capability will be used to intrude upon
cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. . . . The price
of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection
to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of
unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous dissent
and discussion of Government action in private conversa-
tion. For private dissent, no less than open public dis-
course, is essential to our free society.'"
In the end, however, the strongest arguments against ex-
tended electronic surveillance were made by Justice Douglas,
a member of the Court's liberal wing and one of the greatest
civil libertarians of modern America. A complete catalogue of
pertinent statements would be beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. Here are only a few of the most noteworthy examples:
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where ev-
eryone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are
no secrets from government.
• . .[T]here begins to emerge a society quite unlike
any we have seen-a society in which the government
may intrude into the secret regions of man's life at will.
105. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787-92 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
106. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312-14 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
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The dangers posed by wiretapping and electronic
surveillance strike at the very heart of the democratic
philosophy ....
Such practices can only have a damaging effect on
our society. Once sanctioned, there is every indication
that their use will indiscriminately spread. The time may
come when no one can be sure whether his words are be-
ing recorded for use at some future time; when everyone
will fear that his most secret thoughts are no longer his
own, but belong to the Government; when the most confi-
dential and intimate conversations are always open to ea-
ger, prying ears. When that time comes, privacy, and with
it liberty, will be gone. . . . When such conditions obtain,
our citizens will be afraid to utter any but the safest and
most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate with any but
the most acceptable people. Freedom as the Constitution
envisages it will have vanished. '
What the ancients knew as "eavesdropping," we now
call "electronic surveillance"; but to equate the two is to
treat man's first gunpowder on the same level as the nu-
clear bomb. Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler
of human privacy ever known.
* . .Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free dis-
course and spontaneous utterances.
• . .[Must everyone live in fear that every word he
speaks may be transmitted or recorded and later repeated
to the entire world? I can imagine nothing that has a
more chilling effect on people speaking their minds and
expressing their views on important matters. The advo-
cates of that regime should spend some time in totalitar-
ian countries and learn firsthand the kind of regime they
are creating here. 08
Douglas warned of the inherent dangers in electronic sur-
veillance.10' If limited to rifle-shot surveillance of a specific
107. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341-43, 352-54 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
108. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756, 762, 764-65 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
109. The only significant argument in favor of extended electronic surveillance
is that our society must be able to use it to combat crime. Several responses are
appropriate. First, we survived without it for a century. Second, recent studies sug-
gest that it has proved far less useful than its advocates in 1968 claimed. See, e.g., H.
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communication by a criminal suspect, electronic surveillance
is tolerable. Extended surveillance, in contrast, is "the great-
est of all invasions of privacy."' 10 It is the "greatest leveler of
human privacy ever known." '' It "strikes at the heart of the
democratic philosophy." 1 2 It leaves "not even a residuum of
true privacy."' 13 As a matter of sound social policy, it should
be eliminated, or at least restricted to the most compelling
situations. The fourth amendment ban on general searches
provides a ready legal justification for imposing the necessary
restrictions. The ban should be enforced.
Enforcement of the fourth amendment ban on extended
electronic surveillance is more than sound social policy.
Viewed in a broad historical perspective, it is one of the most
important challenges our society faces. A basic axiom of the
framers of the Constitution was that government should be
weak, so that the people might be free. During the Great De-
pression, however, the nation opted for large-scale govern-
ment intervention in economic affairs. As a result, "big gov-
ernment" is here to stay. With it comes the threat that
government control will expand from the economic arena into
the sphere of personal liberty and privacy. The greatest vigi-
lance is necessary to insure that the individual's intimate life
is protected from the uninvited ear and intruding eye of the
new and powerful government apparatus which we have
created.""
V. CONCLUSION
The case is clear. A core purpose of the fourth amend-
ment is to ban general searches. Extended electronic surveil-
SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE (1977); H. SCHWARTZ, REFLECTION
ON SIX YEARS OF LEGITIMATED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1974). Third, and most ba-
sic, it is simply not worth the price. It is far better that some criminals remain un-
caught than that we live under a regime of general electronic surveillance.
110. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 64 (Douglas, J., concurring).
111. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
112. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. at 352 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
113. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. It is ironic in this day of tax revolts and anti-government sentiment that
the demands for reduction of government power seem to focus on social benefit pro-
grams and not on the growing power of law enforcement institutions to obliterate
personal privacy and liberty. We seem intent on creating a government stripped of all
power to help those in need but all-powerful in the field of surveillance and repressive
social control.
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lance is a general search since it inherently involves both a
dragnet search and general rummaging through private
speech. Indeed, it is the quintessential, paradigmatic general
search, far more insidious and repressive than traditional gen-
eral searches. It is subject to the fourth amendment ban, and,
as a matter of sound constitutional law and social policy, it
should be restricted drastically. Except in cases of extraordi-
nary need, extended electronic surveillance is intolerable in a
nation committed to freedom of speech and personal privacy.
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APPENDIX: Boyd Is DEAD AGAIN. LONG LIVE Boyd!
Boyd v. United States"5 is by all odds the most cele-
brated of all United States Supreme Court cases construing
the fourth amendment. A leading fourth amendment scholar
has decribed the status of the case as follows:
Not only was the Boyd case the first Fourth Amendment
case of real consequence, but it remains to this day a
landmark of constitutional interpretation .... [T]he
ringing tones of its message and the grandeur of its
passages assure it a prominent place among the Court's
most historic pronouncements.
... The Supreme Court itself, in later years, even
when departing from the letter, and occasionally the
spirit, of the Boyd case, never failed to refer to it
reverently."'
Despite Boyd's fame, Justices who are not committed to a
liberal construction of constitututional liberties have recur-
rently attacked the decision. Before it had reached the age of
twenty, for example, Boyd was declared moribund by the
Court. "Seventeen years later, however, in Adams v. New
York, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion which
seemed effectively to overrule the doctrine on the Boyd
case."
117
Boyd rose from its premature burial. In the landmark
case of Weeks v. United States,"' the court in effect over-
ruled Adams v. New York,119 by restricting it to its specific
facts and reinstated the doctrines of Boyd.
Thereafter, the Court repeatedly praised Boyd. In 1925,
the Court called it "the leading case on the subject of search
and seizure . ... "s Justice Brandeis, in his Olmstead dis-
sent, called Boyd "a case that will be remembered as long as
civil liberty lives in the United States."' 1 In 1963, Justice
Brennan wrote, "The authority of the Boyd decision has never
been impeached." 2
115. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
116. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SuPREME COURT 49, 57 (1966).
117. Id. at 110.
118. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
119. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
120. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
121. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
122. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 456 (1963) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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In recent years, Boyd has once again been repudiated by
a Court that is less than wholly committed to the fourth
amendment. In Fisher v. United States,'" for example, the
Court, while weakening the rule against compulsory produc-
tion of incriminating documents, said, "Several of Boyd's ex-
press or implicit declarations have not stood the test of
time .... [Here the Court listed five areas in which Boyd has
been eroded in recent years.] It would appear that . . . the
precise claim sustained in Boyd would now be rejected
... ,, " Boyd, in other words, is dead once again, and the
smoking gun is in the hand of the current United States Su-
preme Court.
Boyd will be born again. The doctrines of the case are
among the cornerstones of our nation's program for protecting
the individuality and privacy of its citizens. The government
has no authority to compel the production of self-incriminat-
ing documents. The government has no authority to seize and
examine the private papers of citizens. By analogy, the gov-
ernment has no authority to engage in extended electronic
surveillance of citizens. These government activities should be
prohibited. They are contrary to the most fundamental rules
of political democracy. They are unreasonable searches and
seizures. They involve compulsory self-incrimination. They
strangle freedom of expression. They kill spontaneity. They
stifle the very thoughts that society needs to adapt present
institutional forms to new conditions. Extended electronic
surveillance is fundamentally wrong and should be constitu-
tionally taboo. We will always return to these basic values in
sane periods. That is why Boyd must resurface. Boyd is dead
again. Long live Boyd.
123. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
124. Id. at 407-08.
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